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Abstract—We study bottleneck routing games where the social
cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the
network. Bottleneck games have been studied in the literature by
having the player’s utility costs to be determined by the worst
congested edge in their paths. However, the Nash equilibria of
such games are inefficient since the price of anarchy can be very
high with respect to the parameters of the game. In order to obtain
smaller price of anarchy we explore exponential bottleneck games
where the utility costs of the players are exponential functions on
the congestion of the edges in their paths. We find that exponential
bottleneck games are very efficient giving a poly-log bound on the
price of anarchy: O(log L · log |E|), where L is the largest path
length in the players strategy sets and E is the set of edges in the
graph.
I. INTRODUCTION
Motivated by the selfish behavior of entities in communica-
tion networks, we study routing games in general networks
where each packet’s path is controlled independently by a
selfish player. We consider noncooperative games with N
players, where each player has a pure strategy profile from
which it selfishly selects a single path from a source node
to a destination node such that the selected path minimizes
the player’s utility cost function (such games are also known
as atomic or unsplittable-flow games). We focus on bottleneck
games where the objective for the social outcome is to minimize
C, the maximum congestion on any edge in the network.
Typically, the congestion on an edge is a non-decreasing
function on the number of paths that use the edge; here, we
consider the congestion to be simply the number of paths that
use the edge.
Bottleneck congestion games have been studied in the lit-
erature [1]–[4] where each player’s utility cost is the worst
congestion on its path edges. In particular, player i has utility
cost function maxe∈pi Ce where pi is the path of the player
and Ce denotes the congestion of edge e. In [1] the authors
observe that bottleneck games are important in networks for
various practical reasons. In wireless networks the maximum
congested edge is related to the lifetime of the network since
the nodes adjacent to high congestion edges transmit large
number of packets which results to higher energy utilization.
Thus, minimizing the maximum edge congestion immediately
translates to longer network lifetime. High congestion edges
also result to congestion hot-spots in the network which may
slow down the performance of the whole network. Hot spots
may also increase the vulnerability of the network to malicious
attacks which aim to to increase the congestion of edges in the
hope to bring down the network or degrade its performance.
Thus, minimizing the maximum congested edge results to hot-
spot avoidance and also to more secure networks.
Bottleneck games are also important from a theoretical point
of view since the maximum edge congestion is immediately
related to the optimal packet scheduling. In a seminal result,
Leighton et al. [5] showed that there exist packet scheduling
algorithms that can deliver the packets along their chosen paths
in time very close to C+D, where D is the maximum chosen
path length. This work on packet scheduling has been extended
in [5]–[9]. When C ≫ D, the congestion becomes the dominant
factor in the packet scheduling performance. Thus, smaller C
immediately implies faster delivery time for the packets in the
network.
A natural problem that arises concerns the effect of the play-
ers’ selfishness on the welfare of the whole network measured
with the social cost C. We examine the consequence of the
selfish behavior in pure Nash equilibria which are stable states
of the game in which no player can unilaterally improve her
situation. We quantify the effect of selfishness with the price of
anarchy (PoA) [10], [11], which expresses how much larger
is the worst social cost in a Nash equilibrium compared to
the social cost in the optimal coordinated solution. The price
of anarchy provides a measure for estimating how closely do
Nash equilibria of bottleneck routing games approximate the
optimal C∗ of the respective routing optimization problem.
Ideally, the price of anarchy should be small. However, the
findings in the literature show that bottleneck games are not
efficient, namely, the price of anarchy may be large. In [1] it
is shown that if the edge-congestion function is bounded by
some polynomial with degree d (with respect to the packets
that use the edge) then PoA = O(|E|d), where E is the set of
edges in the graph. In [2] the authors consider the case d = 1
and they show that PoA = O(L + log |V |), where L is the
maximum path length in the players strategies and V is the
set of nodes. This bound is asymptotically tight since there are
game instances with PoA = Ω(L). Note that L ≤ |E|, and
2further L may be significantly smaller than |E|. However, L
can still be proportional to the size of the graph, and thus the
price of anarchy can be large.
A. Contributions
In this work we focus on exploring alternative utility cost
functions for the players that have better impact on the social
cost C. We introduce exponential bottleneck games where the
player utilities are exponential functions on the congestion of
the edges of the paths. In particular, the player utility cost
function for player i is: ∑
e∈pi
2Ce,
where pi is the player’s chosen path. Note that the new utility
cost is a sum of exponential terms on the congestion of the
edges in the path (instead of the max that we described earlier).
Using the new utility cost functions we show that exponential
games have always Nash equilibria which can be obtained by
best response dynamics. The main result is that the price of
anarchy is poly-log:
PoA = O(logL · log |E|),
where L is the maximum path length in the players strategy set
and E is the set of edges in the graph. This price of anarchy
bound is a significant improvement over the price of anarchy
from the regular utility cost functions described earlier.
Exponential cost functions are legitimate metrics for the
utility costs of players since they reflect the performance of the
chosen paths according to congestion. Each player is motivated
to select a path with lower utility cost since it will provide
a better quality path with lower congestion that can affect
positively the player’s performance. As we discuss in Section V,
the reason that we use exponential cost functions instead of
polynomial ones is that low degree polynomials give high price
of anarchy.
B. Related Work
Congestion games were introduced and studied in [12], [13].
Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [10] introduced the notion of
price of anarchy in the specific parallel link networks model in
which they provide the bound PoA = 3/2. Since then, many
routing and congestion game models have been studied which
are distinguished by the network topology, cost functions, type
of traffic (atomic or splittable), and kind of equilibria (pure or
mixed). Roughgarden and Tardos [14] provided the first result
for splittable flows in general networks in which they showed
that PoA ≤ 4/3 for a player cost which reflects to the sum of
congestions of the edges of a path. Pure equilibria with atomic
flow have been studied in [2], [13], [15]–[17] (our work fits
into this category), and with splittable flow in [14], [18]–[20].
Mixed equilibria with atomic flow have been studied in [10],
[11], [21]–[29], and with splittable flow in [30], [31].
Most of the work in the literature uses a cost metric measured
as the sum of congestions of all the edges of the player’s path
[14], [15], [17], [19], [20], [26]. Our work differs from these
approaches since we adopt the exponential metric for player
cost. The vast majority of the work on routing games has been
performed for parallel link networks, with only a few exceptions
on general network topologies [2], [15], [18], [30], which we
consider here.
Our work is close to [2], where the authors consider the
player cost Ci and social cost C. They prove that the price of
stability is 1. They show that the price of anarchy is bounded
by O(L+log n), where L is the maximum allowed path length.
They also prove that κ ≤ PoA ≤ c(κ2 + log2n), where κ is
the size of the largest edge-simple cycle in the graph and c is
a constant. Some of the techniques that we use in our proofs
(for example expansion) were introduced in [2]. Another related
result for general networks which has a brief discussion of the
convergence of maximum player cost (Ci) games is [16] where
the authors focus on parallel link networks, but also give some
results for general topologies on convergence to equilibria.
Bottleneck congestion games have been studied in [1], where
the authors consider the maximum congestion metric in general
networks with splittable and atomic flow (but without consider-
ing path lengths). They prove the existence and non-uniqueness
of equilibria in both the splittable and atomic flow models. They
show that finding the best Nash equilibrium that minimizes the
social cost is a NP-hard problem. Further, they show that the
price of anarchy may be unbounded for specific edge congestion
functions (these are functions of the number of paths that use
the edge). If the edge congestion function is polynomial with
degree p then they bound the price of anarchy with O(mp),
where m is the number of edges in the graph. In the splittable
case they show that if the users always follow paths with low
congestion then the equilibrium achieves optimal social cost.
Outline of Paper
In Section II we give basic definitions. In section III we show
that exponential bottleneck games have always Nash equilibria.
We study the price of anarchy in Section IV. We finish with
conclusions and future work in Section V.
II. DEFINITIONS
A. Path Routings
Consider an arbitrary graph G = (V,E) with nodes V and
edges E. Let Π = {pi1, . . . , piN} be a set of packets such that
each pii has a source ui and destination vi. A routing p =
[p1, p2, · · · , pN ] is a collection of paths, where pi is a path for
packet pii from ui to vi. We will denote by E(pi) the set of
edges in path pi. Consider a particular routing p. The edge-
congestion of an edge e, denoted Ce, is the number of paths in
p that use edge e. For any set of edges A ⊆ E, we will denote
by CA = maxe∈A Ce. For any path q, the path-congestion is
Cq = CE(q). For any path pi ∈ p, we will also use the notation
Ci = Cpi . The network congestion is C = CE , which is the
maximum edge-congestion over all edges in E.
We continue with definitions of exponential functions on
congestion. Consider a routing p. For any edge e, we will
denote C˜e = 2Ce . For any set of edges A ⊆ E, we will denote
C˜A =
∑
e∈A C˜e. For any path q, we will denote C˜q = C˜E(q).
3For any path pi ∈ p we will denote C˜i = C˜pi . We denote
the length (number of edges) of any path q as |q|. Whenever
necessary we will append (p) in the above definitions to signify
the dependance on routing p. For example, we will write C(p)
instead of C.
B. Routing Games
A routing game in graph G is a tuple R = (G,N ,P), where
N = {1, 2, . . . , N} is the set of players such that each player
i corresponds to a packet pii with source ui and destination vi,
and P are the strategies of the players. We will use the notation
pii to denote player i and its respective packet. In the set P =⋃
i∈N Pi the subset Pi denotes the strategy set of player pii
which a collection of available paths in G for player pii from
ui to vi. Any path p ∈ Pi is a pure strategy available to player
pii. A pure strategy profile is any routing p = [p1, p2, · · · , pN ],
where pi ∈ Pi. The longest path length in P is denoted L(P) =
maxp∈P |p|. (When the context is clear we will simply write
L).
For game R and routing p, the social cost (or global cost)
is a function of routing p, and it is denoted SC(p). The
player or local cost is also a function on p denoted pci(p).
We use the standard notation p−i to refer to the collection
of paths {p1, · · · , pi−1, pi+1, · · · , pN}, and (pi;p−i) as an
alternative notation for p which emphasizes the dependence
on pi. Player pii is locally optimal (or stable) in routing p if
pci(p) ≤ pci(p′i;p−i) for all paths p′i ∈ Pi. A greedy move
by a player pii is any change of its path from pi to p′i which
improves the player’s cost, that is, pci(p) > pci(p′i;p−i). Best
response dynamics are sequences of greedy moves by players.
A routing p is in a Nash Equilibrium (we say p is a
Nash-routing) if every player is locally optimal. Nash-routings
quantify the notion of a stable selfish outcome. In the games
that we study there could exist multiple Nash-routings. A
routing p∗ is an optimal pure strategy profile if it has minimum
attainable social cost: for any other pure strategy profile p,
SC(p∗) ≤ SC(p).
We quantify the quality of the Nash-routings with the price
of anarchy (PoA) (sometimes referred to as the coordination
ratio) and the price of stability (PoS). Let P denote the set of
distinct Nash-routings, and let SC∗ denote the social cost of
an optimal routing p∗. Then,
PoA = sup
p∈ P
SC(p)
SC∗
, PoS = inf
p∈ P
SC(p)
SC∗
.
III. EXPONENTIAL BOTTLENECK GAMES AND THEIR
STABILITY
Let R = (G,N ,P) be a routing game such that for any
routing p the social cost function is SC = C, and the player
cost function is pci = C˜i. We refer to such routing games as
exponential bottleneck games.
We show that exponential games have always Nash-routings.
We also show that there are instances of exponential games that
have multiple Nash-routings. The existence of Nash routings
relies on finding an appropriate potential function that provides
an ordering of the routings. Given an arbitrary initial state a
greedy move of a player can only give a new routing with
smaller order. Thus, best response dynamics (repeated greedy
moves) converge to a routing where no player can improve
further, namely, they converge to a Nash-routing. The potential
function that we will use is: f(p) = C˜E(p). We show that any
greedy move gives a new routing with lower potential.
Lemma 3.1: If in routing p a player pii performs a greedy
move, then the resulting routing p′ has C˜E(p) > C˜E(p′).
Proof: Suppose that player pii has path pi ∈ p and
switches to path p′i ∈ p′. Then, C˜pi(p) > C˜p′i(p′). Let
A = E(pi) \ E(p′i) and B = E(p′i) \ E(pi). It has to
be that C˜A(p) > C˜B(p′) since pii’s cost decreases. Further,
C˜B(p
′) = 2C˜B(p) and C˜A(p) = 2C˜A(p′), since the presence
or absence of player’s pi path in the edges A and B alters their
total cost by a factor of 2. Let H = E \{A∪B}. We have that
C˜H(p) = C˜H(p
′), since pii does not affect those edges. Since
E = H ∪ A ∪B and H , A, B are disjoint, we have that
C˜E(p) = C˜H(p) + C˜A(p) + C˜B(p)
= C˜H(p
′) + 2C˜A(p
′) +
C˜B(p
′)
2
= C˜H(p
′) + C˜A(p
′) + C˜B(p
′)
+
(
C˜A(p
′)− C˜B(p
′)
2
)
= C˜E(p
′) +
(
C˜A(p
′)− C˜B(p
′)
2
)
.
Since C˜A(p) = 2C˜A(p′) and C˜A(p) > C˜B(p′), we have that
2C˜A(p
′) > C˜B(p
′), or equivalently
C˜A(p
′)− C˜B(p
′)
2
> 0.
Therefore, C˜E(p) > C˜E(p′), as needed.
Since the result of the potential function cannot be smaller
than zero, Lemma 3.1 implies that best response dynamics
converge to Nash-routings. Thus, we have:
Theorem 3.2: Every exponential game instance R =
(G,N ,P) has a Nash-routing.
u1
u2
u3
v1
v2
v3
u1
u2
u3
v1
v2
v3
p′2
p′3
p′1
p2
p3
p1
Nash-routing p Nash-routing p′
Fig. 1. An exponential game instance with multiple Nash-routings
We continue to show that there are exponential games
with multiple Nash-routings. Consider the example of Figure
1. There are three players pi1, pi2, pi3 with respective sources
u1, u2, u3 and destinations v1, v2, v3. The strategy set of each
player are all feasible paths from their source to destination. In
4the left part of Figure 1 is a Nash-routing p = [p1, p2, p3] with
social cost SC(p) = 2 and respective player costs pc1(p) = 4,
pc2(p) = 8, and pc3(p) = 6. On the right part of the same
figure is another Nash-routing p′ = [p′1, p′2, p′3] with social
cost SC(p′) = 1 and respective player costs pc1(p′) = 2,
pc2(p
′) = 6, and pc3(p′) = 6. Thus, we can make the
following observation:
Observation 3.3: There exist exponential game instances
with multiple Nash-routings.
IV. PRICE OF ANARCHY
We bound the price of anarchy in exponential bottleneck
games. Consider an exponential bottleneck routing game R =
(G,N ,P). Let p = [p1, . . . , pN ] be an arbitrary Nash-routing
with social cost Cˆ; from Theorem 3.2 we know that p exists.
Let p∗ = [p∗1, . . . , p∗N ] represent the routing with optimal social
cost C∗. Let L be the maximum path length in the players
strategy sets and L∗ ≤ L be the longest path in p∗. Denote
l∗ = lgL∗.
We will obtain an upper bound on the price of anarchy
PoA = C/C∗ by finding a lower bound on the number of
players as well as the number of edges in the p. The proof
relies on the notion of self-sufficient sets:
Definition 4.1 (Self-sufficient set): Consider an arbitrary set
of players S in Nash-routing p in game R. We label the
equilibrium of S as self-sufficient if, after removing the paths
of all players /∈ S from p, for every pii ∈ S, the cost C˜p∗
i
remains at least pci(p). Thus pii cannot switch to path p∗i only
because of other players in S.
If a set S is not self-sufficient, then additional players S′ must
be present to guarantee the Nash-routing. Thus, we define the
notion of support sets:
Definition 4.2 (Support set): If S is not a self-sufficient set,
then there is a set of players S′, where S ∩ S′ = ∅, such that
the paths of the players in S′∪S guarantee that C˜p∗
i
remains at
least pci(p) even if all the other players /∈ S′ ∪S are removed
from the game.
The players in S′ may not be self-sufficient either. This
process is repeated until a self-sufficient set is found. Our
goal is to find a lower bound on a self-sufficient set players.
We start with a small set of players based on Cˆ and the
optimal congestion value C∗, prove they are not self-sufficient
and consider a sequence of expansions that will eventually
lead to a self-sufficient set. We find the minimum number of
these expansions to terminate the process and thus find the
minimum number of players (and edges) needed to support a
maximum equilibrium congestion of Cˆ . For a given graph G
and players/edges this gives us an upper bound on Cˆ relative
to C∗.
Initially assume C∗ = 1, i.e every player in the optimally
congested network has a unique optimal path to its destination
of length at most L∗. For the game Gˆ we will consider sets
of players in stages, depending on their costs in Gˆ. Let S(i)
denote the set of players in stage i, 1 ≤ i ≤ Cˆ with player
costs C˜ : 2Cˆ−i+2 ≤ C˜ ≤ 2Cˆ−i+1. Consider an arbitrary player
pi in stage i. We let P ∗ denote its optimal path and Φ(P ∗) the
minimum cost of path P ∗ in Gˆ. Since Π is in equilibrium, we
must have Φ(P ∗) > 2Cˆ−i−1.
We formally define expansion chains as follows: In stage i,
1 ≤ i ≤ Cˆ−1, let A(i) denote the set of all players occupying
exactly one edge of congestion Cˆ− i+1, let B(i) denote the
set of all players whose maximum edge congestion C′ satisfies
Cˆ−i ≥ C′ > Cˆ−i−l∗−1 and finally let D(i) = S(i)−A(i)−B(i).
For i > 1, a level i expansion chain consists of a single chain
of nodes r → Xi+1(r)→ Xi+2(r) → . . ., where the root node
r represents the players of {B(i), D(i)}. Thus there are two
possible expansion chains rooted at level i, except for level 1,
where A(1) can also be the root node for a third expansion
chain. The rest of the chain consists of a sequence of nodes
such that node Xi+k(r) represents the support set of players
of node Xi+k−1(r).
We first show below, a sufficient condition on Cˆ for expan-
sion chains to exist at any stage. For technical reasons, we will
use l∗1 = log2(L
∗−1).
Lemma 4.3: Given a non-empty player set X(i) ∈
{A(i), B(i), D(i)}, either there exists an expansion chain rooted
at X(i) or the players of X(i) are on the expansion chain of
other players for all stages i : 1 ≤ i ≤ Cˆ−l∗1−11.
Proof: To prove the existence of expansion chains at any
stage i, we need to show that the set of players X(i) is not self-
sufficient. Consider each of the possible elements of X(i) sepa-
rately. First consider the set D(i). Clearly, D(i)’s equilibrium is
not self-sufficient since the maximum congestion experienced
by players in D(i) is Cˆ−i−l∗1−2 and thus the maximum cost
of an optimal path composed exclusively of edges from D(i)
is (L∗−1+1) · 2Cˆ−i−l∗1−2 = 2Cˆ−i−2 + 2Cˆ−i−l∗1−2, which
is strictly less than the minimum required cost of an optimal
path Φ(P ∗)+1.
Next consider the set B(i). Assume for purposes of con-
tradiction that B(i) is self-sufficient, i.e there are a sufficient
number of edges composed exclusively of players in B(i) that
are also on all the optimal paths of B(i) and each optimal
path has cost at least Φ(P ∗)+1. Let B(i)j denote the edges of
congestion Cˆ−i−j composed exclusively of players in B(i),
where 0 ≤ j ≤ Cˆ− i−1. Note that a single player in B(i)
may have several edges across different B(i)j ’s. Each edge of
B
(i)
j contributes 2Cˆ−i−j to the total cost of each of the Cˆ−i−j
players on the edge. Since the total cost of each player in B(i)
is bounded by 2Cˆ−i+1, we must have
Cˆ−i−1∑
j=0
|B(i)j |(Cˆ−i−j)2Cˆ−i−j ≤ |B(i)|2Cˆ−i+1
≡
l∗1+2∑
j=0
|B(i)j |
(
Cˆ−i−j
2j+1
)
≤ |B(i)| (1)
Since B(i) is in equilibrium, each of the |B(i)| optimal paths
has cost > Φ(P ∗). For j ≥ 1, each edge e ∈ B(i)j on an optimal
path P ∗opt contributes Φ(P ∗)/2j−1 towards the cost of this path.
(Each edge in B(i)0 contributes Φ(P ∗)). Now using the fact that
5B(i)’s equilibrium is self-contained, we must have
∑
e∈B
(i)
0
Φ(P ∗) +
Cˆ−i−1∑
j=1
∑
e∈B
(i)
j
Φ(P ∗)
2j−1
>
∑
P∗opt
Φ(P ∗)
≡ |B(i)0 |+
Cˆ−i−1∑
j=1
|B(i)j |
2j−1
> |B(i)| (2)
We note the following: edges of congestion≤ Cˆ−i−l∗1−3 must
account for less than half the cost of any optimal path on which
they are present. The maximum contribution of such edges over
L∗−1 edges of the optimal path is Φ(P ∗)/2, implying that there
must be one edge of higher congestion (≥ Cˆ−i− l∗1−2) that
contributes more than half of the required total cost≥ Φ(P ∗)+1.
Thus we must have
Cˆ−i−1∑
j=l∗+3
|B(i)j |
2j−1
< |B(i)0 |+
l∗1+2∑
j=1
|B(i)j |
2j−1
(3)
and therefore Eq. 2 becomes
|B(i)0 |+
l∗1+2∑
j=1
|B(i)j |
2j−1
>
|B(i)|
2
(4)
Comparing Eq. 4 with Eq. 1, we get
2|B(i)0 |+
l∗1+2∑
j=1
|B(i)j |
2j−2
≥
l∗1+2∑
j=0
|B(i)j |
2j+1
(
Cˆ−i−j)
or simplifying
l∗1+2∑
j=0
|B(i)j |
2j+1
· (8+j−(Cˆ−i)) ≥ 0 (5)
Since |B(i)j | > 0 for at least some j : 1 ≤ j ≤ l∗1 +2,
Eq. 5 is impossible for (Cˆ− i) > l∗1+10, which contradicts
the assumption that B(i) is self-sufficient.
Finally for the case of players from A(i), each subset of
Cˆ−i+1 players shares an edge. Thus the maximum number of
optimal edges available from within the set is |A(i)|/(Cˆ−i+1).
Since this is much less than the number of optimal paths |A(i)|,
players in A(i) are also not self-sufficient.
Concluding, none of the player sets {A(i), B(i), D(i)} are
self-sufficient and hence either these players are on the expan-
sion chains of some other players or there are expansion chains
rooted at these players in stage i : 1 ≤ i ≤ Cˆ−l∗−11.
The above lemma guarantees the existence of at least one
expansion chain rooted at stage 1 when Cˆ = O(l∗). We
now want to find the minimum number of edges required to
support the game with equilibrium cost 2Cˆ . This corresponds
to finding the smallest expansion chain rooted at stage 1. By
our definition, an expansion chain consists of new players
occupying the expansion edges of players on the previous
levels. It would seem that chains should consist of type B
players since they occupy multiple edges and thus fewer players
are required. However as the lemma below shows it is players
of type A that minimize the expansion edges.
Consider an arbitrary player pi of type B in Gˆ occupying
edges E = {e1, e2, . . . , ek} of non-increasing congestion
c1 ≥ c2 ≥ . . . ck that are optimal edges (expansion edges) of
other players, where we assume maximum congestion c1 ≥ 2.
We want to answer the following question: Is there an alter-
nate equilibrium/game containing player(s) with the same total
equilibrium cost as pi, but requiring fewer edges to support this
equilibrium cost. Note that when comparing these two games,
the actual routing paths (i.e source-destinations) do not have
to be the same. All we need to show is the existence of an
alternate game (even with different source-destination pairs for
the players) that has the same equilibrium cost.
In particular, consider an alternate game G′ in which pi is
replaced by a set P = {pi1, pi2, . . . , pik} of type A players
occupying single edges of congestion c1, c2, . . . , ck, where pi
and the set P are also in equilibrium in their respective games.
The equilibrium cost of pi and set P is the same (∑kj=1 2cj ) as
they are occupying edges of the same congestion. Since both
pi in game Gˆ and the set of players P are in equilibrium and
occupying expansion edges of other players in their respective
games, C∗ = 1 implies they must have their own expansion
edges in their respective games. Suppose we can show that
the number of expansion edges required by the k players in
P is at most those required by the single player of type B.
Since pi is an arbitrary type B player, this argument applied
recursively implies that all expansion edges in the game Gˆ
should be occupied by type A players to minimize the total
number of expansion edges. Thus we will have shown that
any equilibrium with cost Cˆ can be supported with fewer total
players if they are of type A than if they are of type B. Let
pi∗ and P ∗ denote the expansion edges of pi and the set P
respectively.
Lemma 4.4: |P ∗| ≤ |pi∗| for arbitrary players pi and set P
with the same equilibrium cost.
Proof: We prove this by strong induction on the length
of player pi’s path. For the basis, assume player pi is on path
(e1, e2) of length 2 in Gˆ, with edges of congestion c1 and
c2 respectively, where c1 ≥ c2. Simultaneously consider two
players pi1 and pi2 on single edges in game G′ with respective
costs 2c1 and 2c2 . We need to show that every possible optimal
path (i.e expansion edges) for pi in Gˆ has two equivalent optimal
paths (of the same or lower total cost) for the two players pi1
and pi2 in G′.
Suppose the optimal path of pi is pi∗ = (e∗1, e∗2, . . . e∗m) in
non-increasing order of congestion c∗1 ≥ c∗2 ≥ . . . c∗m. Consider
two cases:
Case 1 c∗1 < c1: Since pi is in equilibrium,
∑m
i=1 2
c∗i ≥
(2c1 + 2c2)/2. Since c∗1 < c1, there exists c∗j such that∑j
i=1 2
c∗i = 2c1−1. Hence optimal path pi∗ can be partitioned
into two paths, pi∗1 = (e∗1, . . . , e∗j ) and pi∗2 = (e∗j+1 . . . e∗m) with
costs C(pi∗1) = 2
c1−1 and C(pi∗2) ≥ 2c2−1. Thus the edges of
pi∗1 and pi∗2 can serve as expansion edges for pi1 and and pi2
in alternate game G′ with appropriate endpoints, specifically,
the endpoints of pi∗1 and pi∗2 will be the same as the endpoints
6of edge e1 and e2 in G′. Hence |P ∗| = |pi∗| in this case as
desired.
Case 2 c∗1 ≥ c1: There are at least c1 ≥ 2 players on player
pi’s optimal path with costs ≥ 2c1 . Since C∗ = 1, these players
must have independent optimal paths of cost ≥ 2c1−1. Hence
at least c1 ≥ 2 such optimal paths are needed to support pi in
game Gˆ. In contrast, in game G′, the two players pi1 and pi2
can be supported by two edges of congestion c1−1 and c2−1,
respectively. Hence |P ∗| = 2 ≤ |pi∗| in this case as well.
For the inductive hypothesis assume |P ∗| ≤ |pi∗| for all paths
upto length k > 2. Consider player pi occupying edges of non-
increasing congestion c1, . . . , ck+1 in Gˆ whose optimal path
has edges of non-increasing congestion c∗1, . . . , c∗m. As before
consider two cases, Case 1 c∗1 < c1: let j1 and j2 be the indices
such that 1) ∑j1i=1 2c∗i = (2c1 + 2c2)/2, and 2) ∑j2i=j1 2c∗i =
(
∑k+1
i=3 2
ci)/2. Note that since c∗1 < c1, indices j1 and j2 exist
with j1 < j2 ≤ m. Instead of player pi consider two new
players P1 and P2, where P1 occupies two edges of congestion
c1 and c2 and P2 occupies edges of congestion c3, c4 . . . ck+1.
From above, j2 edges are required to satisfy P1 and P2 and
|pi∗| = m ≥ j2. Players P1 and P2 have path lengths < k and
thus by the inductive hypothesis, the number of expansion edges
P ∗ required to support P1 and P2 assuming they were replaced
by type A players satisfies |P ∗| ≤ j2 ≤ |pi∗| as desired.
Case 2 c∗1 ≥ c1: First assume m ≥ 2. Let j be the largest
index such that
∑j
i=1 2
ci ≤ 2c∗1+1. Clearly j exists since
c∗1 ≥ c1. Now instead of player pi, consider two players P1 and
P2 with P1 occupying edges of congestion c1, c2, . . . cj and
P2 occupying edges of congestion cj+1, . . . cm, respectively.
The edge of congestion c∗1 can satisfy P1 while the remaining
edges of the optimal path pi∗ can satisfy P2. As in the previous
case, players P1 and P2 have path lengths < k and thus by
the inductive hypothesis, the number of expansion edges P ∗
required to support P1 and P2 assuming they were replaced by
type A players satisfies |P ∗| ≤ |pi∗| as desired. The case when
m = 1 is omitted for brevity.
As a consequence of lemma 4.4, we have
Lemma 4.5: For Cˆ > l∗+11, the expansion chain rooted in
stage 1 and occupying the minimum number of edges consists
only of players of type A (other than the root).
Next we derive the size of the smallest network required
to support an equilibrium congestion of Cˆ. Without loss of
generality, we assume there exists at least one type A player
in stage 1, i.e a single edge of congestion Cˆ and derive the
minimum chain rooted at A(1). From lemma 4.5, there exists
an expansion chain rooted at A(1) with only type A players.
Among all such expansion chains, the one with the minimum
number of players (equivalently edges, since each type A player
occupies a single edge) is defined below.
Theorem 4.6: ECmin, the expansion chain with minimum
number of edges that supports a self-sufficient equilibrium
rooted at A(1) is defined by ECmin : A(1) → A(l∗+2) →
A(2l
∗+3) → A(3l∗+4) → . . . A(Cˆ−1) Every player in ECmin
has an optimal path whose length is the maximum allowed L∗.
The depth of chain ECmin is O(Cˆ/l∗).
For technical reasons, we don’t terminate ECmin with players
from A(Cˆ) i.e single edges of congestion 1. Such a network
can be shown to be unstable (i.e no equilibrium exists). Rather,
the optimal paths of players from A(Cˆ−1) (i.e with player cost
4) are of length 2 with congestion 0 in Gˆ. This does not affect
our count of the total number of edges required to derive the
PoA below. We need a lower bound on the number of edges to
derive an upper bound on the PoA, so (under)counting ECmin
only upto stage A(Cˆ−1) is acceptable for our purposes.
To prove this theorem, we need a couple of technical lemmas
which determine the minimum rate of expansion of an expan-
sion chain. We describe these lemmas using the preliminary
setup below. Let pi denote the set of Cˆ−i+1 players occupying
a single edge in A(i), for some i ≥ 1. Let pim ∈ pi denote
an arbitrary player with pi∗m = (e1, e2, . . . ek) denoting pim’s
optimal path, where k ≤ L∗. For the moment, assume all
edges on pi∗m have the same congestion c. We first note that
the largest stage from which type A players can support pim is
i+ l∗+1 since the player cost is PCm = 2Cˆ−i+1 and we must
have k · 2c ≥ 2Cˆ−i. Using k ≤ L∗, we must have congestion
c ≥ Cˆ − i − l∗ and the largest stage where this is possible is
stage i+l∗+1. Now consider the two (partial) expansion chains
EC1 : pi → A(i+1+l∗) and EC2 : pi → A(i+j) → A(i+1+l∗),
where 1 ≤ j ≤ l∗. We evaluate both chains at stage i+ l∗− 1.
Let |EC1| and |EC2| denote the number of edges in the
respective chains. Then we have,
Lemma 4.7: |EC1| ≤ |EC2|, i.e expanding directly to the
l∗ + 1th succeeding stage is cheaper than expanding via an
intermediate stage.
Proof: First consider EC1. Since |pi| = Cˆ − i + 1 and
C∗ = 1, there are Cˆ− i+1 optimal paths at the first expansion
stage of EC1. Each optimal path length is the longest allowed
i.e 2l∗ . Clearly Cˆ − i − l∗ players on each edge of each such
path are enough to support the equilibrium cost of pi. Thus the
total of expansion edges in EC1 is (Cˆ − i+ 1)2l∗ .
For EC2, again there are Cˆ− i+1 optimal paths at the first
expansion stage. However each edge of each optimal path now
has congestion Cˆ−i−j+1. Each optimal path must have length
l ≥ 2j−1, since l ·2Cˆ−i−j+1 ≥ 2Cˆ−i. Thus the total number of
edges at this stage of EC2 is at least (Cˆ− i+1)2j−1 while the
total number of players is at least (Cˆ−i+1)(Cˆ−i−j+1)2j−1.
Each of these players has its own optimal path, with each edge
on a path having congestion Cˆ − i− l∗, by definition of EC2.
The cost of each optimal path must be at least 2Cˆ−i−j and so
the length l of each such path is at least 2l∗−j since l·2Cˆ−i−l∗ ≥
2Cˆ−i−j . Thus the total number of edges in this stage of EC2 is
at least (Cˆ− i+1)(Cˆ− i− j+1)2j−12l∗−j . Adding the edges
in both stages and simplifying, we get the overall number of
edges required to support the equilibrium of pi in EC2 as
(Cˆ − i+ 1)
[
2j−1 +
(Cˆ − i− j + 1)
2
2l
∗
]
(6)
Using the fact that Cˆ ≥ i+j+1 by definition of expansion, we
can see that the number of edges in EC2 is at least as much
as |EC1| = (Cˆ − i+ 1)2l∗ .
7Now consider the two (partial) expansion chains EC3 : pi →
A(i+1+l
∗) → A(i+1+l∗+k) and EC4 : pi → A(i+1+l∗−j) →
A(i+1+l
∗+k) where 1 ≤ j ≤ l∗ and j + k ≤ l∗ + 1. (Note that
the condition on j + k is because one cannot directly expand
beyond l∗+ 1 stages due to the maximum optimal path length
constraint). Then we have
Lemma 4.8: |EC3| ≤ |EC4|. Expanding to larger stages (i.e
any stage after i+ l∗+ 1) is cheaper via stage i+ l∗+1 than
via any intermediate stage before it. Equivalently (since larger
stages imply expansion edges with lower congestions), when
starting from stage i it is cheapest to expand via the lowest
possible congested edges which are in stage i+ l∗ + 1.
Due to space constraints, we skip the proof which counts edges
similar to the previous lemma. The proof of Theorem 4.6
follows from lemmas 4.7- 4.8, using the fact that starting from
any stage i, the minimum cost expansion arises by selecting
players from stage i+ l∗ + 1 to occupy expansion edges, with
all optimal path lengths being the maximum possible L∗. Due
to space constraints, we omit a formal proof by induction for
showing that the number of expansion edges is minimized when
all edges on an optimal path have the same congestion.
ECmin defined in Theorem 4.6 is also the minimum sized
chain when the root players are from B(1) or D(1) although
the number of edges required in the supporting graph is slightly
different as we see later. In these cases, all stages (other than the
root) in the minimum expansion chain consist of type A players
by lemma 4.5 and the proof of Theorem 4.6 is immediately
applicable in choosing the specific indices of the expansion
stages required to support the equilibrium). As we will show
later, the PoA is maximized when the chain is rooted at A(1).
Theorem 4.9: When C∗ = 1, the upper bound κ on the Price
of Anarchy PoA of game Gˆ is given by the minimum of 1)
κ = O(logL∗) or 2) κ( log(κL∗)) ≤ logL∗ · log |E|
Proof: To obtain an upper bound on the PoA, we want
to find the smallest graph that can support an equilibrium cost
of 2Cˆ . Since the optimal path length L∗ can range from O(1)
to O(|E|), we evaluate smallness both in terms of path length
and number of edges.
Clearly, in the case when there is no expansion in Gˆ, the Price
of Anarchy is O(logL∗), since by lemma 4.3, Cˆ ≤ l∗1+11 and
the PoA = Cˆ/C∗ = O(logL∗). Consider the case when there
is expansion in the network i.e Cˆ >> logL∗. To bound the
PoA, we will compute the number of edges in the minimum
sized expansion chain. First assume there exists a single edge
of congestion Cˆ (labeled as player set pi) and exactly one
expansion chain ECmin : pi → A(l∗+2) → A(2l∗+3) → . . . in
the graph i.e the only players in the graph are those required to
be on the expansion edges of ECmin. Using the standard notion
of depth, the node corresponding to the player set A(1+k(l∗+1))
on ECmin is defined to be at depth k, with the root node at
depth 0. At a given depth k, we define the following notations:
Let Ek denote the total number of expansion edges at depth
k (i.e the edges on comprising the optimal paths of players at
depth k − 1), Pk denote the minimum number of players who
require players from pk+1 on their optimal paths and Ck denote
the congestion on any expansion edge.
At depth 0, we have E0 = 1 (a single edge e of congestion
C0 = Cˆ) Note that P0 = Cˆ − 1. Even though we have
Cˆ players, one of these players might have its optimal path
coincident with edge e. However for all k > 0, Pk = EkCk
since all the edges in Ek are already optimal edges of players
from Pk−1. We also have Ck = Cˆ − kl∗ − k (by definition
of type A congestion), and finally Ek = Pk−1L∗, since every
packet in Pk−1 has its own optimal path (C∗ = 1) and every
optimal path on ECmin is of length L∗. Putting these together,
we obtain a recursive definition of Ek = (L∗)kP0Πk−1t=1Ct. We
terminate our evaluation of the expansion chain when expansion
edges have a congestion of 2, i.e Cˆ−kl∗−k = 2 which implies
a depth of d = (Cˆ − 2)/(l∗ + 1).
For technical reasons, we don’t terminate the chain with
players from A(Cˆ) i.e single edges of congestion 1. Such a
network can be shown to be unstable (i,e no equilibrium exists.
Rather, the optimal paths of players from A(Cˆ−1) (i.e with
player cost 4) are of length 2 with congestion 0 in Gˆ. This
does not significantly affect our count of the total number of
edges required to derive the PoA below.
Thus the total number of edges in ECmin is bounded by
|ECmin| = 1 + (Cˆ−1)
[
L∗ + (L∗)2(Cˆ−l∗−1) +
. . .+ (L∗)dpit=dt=1(Cˆ−tl∗−t)
]
(7)
With some algebraic manipulations, we can bound Eq. 7 as
|ECmin| ≥
(
e−CˆCˆCˆ
√
Cˆ(L∗)Cˆ
) 1
l∗ (8)
Let |E| denote the actual number of edges in graph G. Since
C∗ = 1, the Price of Anarchy is Cˆ . Using κ to denote the upper
bound on the PoA and simplifying, we get
κ(log(κL∗)− 1) ≤ logL∗ · log |E| (9)
Hence the PoA is bounded by a polylog function of log |E| in
the worst case.
Can we get a larger upper bound on the POA if the
expansion chain is rooted at B(1)/D(1) instead of A(1)? To
examine this, let Cˆ − q be the largest congestion in Gˆ, q > 0.
We need 2q such edges in order to satisfy the maximum player
cost of 2Cˆ . All these edges can be used as expansion edges for
other players. From the analysis in Theorem 4.9, we note that
expansion between stages occurs at a factorial rate. Thus using
these 2q edges as high up in the chain as possible (thereby
reducing the need for new expansion edges) will minimize the
expansion rate. The best choice for q then is l∗. In this case,
we have a single player pim in equilibrium in Gˆ, occupying
L∗ edges of congestion Cˆ − l∗. These L∗ edges are also the
optimal edges of pim, i.e its equilibrium and optimal paths
are identical. Hence the first stage of expansion in this chain
is for the L∗(Cˆ − l∗ − 1) players on the L∗ edges of pim.
From this point on the minimum sized chain for this graph is
identical to the minimum sized chain ECmin defined above.
The total number of edges in this chain can be computed in a
manner similar to above. While the number of edges is smaller
than ECmin, it can be shown that the PoA is also smaller
8Cˆ − l∗. Hence the upper bound on the PoA is obtained using
an expansion chain rooted at A(1).
So far we have assumed the optimal bottleneck congestion
C∗ = 1 in our derivations. We now show that increasing C∗
decreases the PoA and hence the previous derivation is the
upper bound. We first evaluate the impact of C∗ = M > 1 on
expansion chains. Having C∗ > 1 implies that more players
can share expansion edges and thus the rate of expansion as
well as the depth of an expansion chain (if it exists) should
decrease. We first show that expansion chains exist even for
arbitrary C∗ = M .
Lemma 4.10: Given a non-empty player set X(i) ∈
{A(i), B(i), D(i)}, either there exists an expansion chain rooted
at X(i) or the players of X(i) are on the expansion chain of
other players for all stages i : Cˆ − i > 8M + l∗1 + 2.
Proof: We provide a brief outline of the proof. First
consider the case of players from A(i). As before, the maximum
number of optimal edges available from within the set is
|A(i)|/(Cˆ− i+1). However each group of M players could
have their optimal paths (of length one) on one such edge.
Thus the number of distinct optimal paths (edges) required is
only |A(i)|/M . If |A(i)|/M ≤ |A(i)|/(Cˆ−i+1) or equivalently
Cˆ − i ≤M − 1, then the players in A(i) are in a self-sustained
equilibrium. This is not true for the given value of i in the
lemma and hence there must be an expansion chain rooted at
A(i). Similarly for the case of players from B(i), the main
modification from 4.3 is in Eq. 2 which now becomes
|B(i)0 |+
Cˆ−i−1∑
j=1
|B(i)j |
2j−1
> |B(i)|/M (10)
for making B(i) self-sustained since the set of B(i) players only
need |B(i)|/M optimal paths. Following the same derivation as
in lemma 4.3, Eq. 5 becomes
l∗1+2∑
j=0
|B(i)j |
2j+1
· (8M+j−(Cˆ−i)) ≥ 0 (11)
For the given values of i and 1 ≤ j ≤ l∗1+2, this is impossible
and hence B(i) must participate in an expansion chain. The
arguments for D(i) are similar to lemma 4.3.
Similarly Lemmas 4.4 and 4.5 can be suitably modified and
the minimum sized chain in this case has the same structure
as defined in Theorem 4.6. Analogous to the C∗ = 1 case,
the maximum PoA occurs when ECmin is rooted at A(1). We
calculate this PoA with C∗ =M , below.
Theorem 4.11: When C∗ = M , the upper bound κ on the
Price of Anarchy PoA of game Gˆ is given by the minimum of
1) κ = O( logL∗
M
) or 2) κ(log(L∗κ)) ≤ l∗ log |E|
M
Proof: Suppose Cˆ is such that there is no expansion in G.
This implies that Cˆ ≤ 8M + l∗1 +3. The PoA is Cˆ/C∗ which
can be seen to be O( logL
∗
M
). Conversely, if there is expansion
we have the following: At depth 0, E0 = 1, C0 = Cˆ and
P0 = Cˆ − M since upto M players may have this edge as
their optimal. As before Ck = Cˆ − kl∗ − k and Pk = EkCk.
However, now Ek the number of expansion edges at depth k
becomes Ek = Pk−1L∗/M since upto M players can share
the same optimal path. Using a similar derivation as before we
get, Ek = ((L∗)k/Mk−1) · ((Cˆ/M)−1)Πk−1t=1Ct which after
some algebraic manipulation leads to
|ECmin| ≥
(
CˆCˆ
√
Cˆ(L∗)Cˆ
M CˆeCˆ
) 1
l∗
(12)
Substituting κ = Cˆ/M and simplifying, we get l∗ log |E| ≥
Cˆ(log κ+ l∗ − 1) which leads to
κ(log(L∗κ)) ≤ l
∗ log |E|
M
(13)
It can be seen that the PoA decreases with increasing optimal
congestion M .
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we have considered exponential bottleneck
games with player utility costs that are exponential functions
on the congestion of the edges of the players paths. The social
cost is C, the maximum congestion on any edge in the graph.
We show that the price of anarchy is poly-log with respect to
the size of the game parameters: O(logL · log |E|), where L
is the largest path length in the players strategy sets, and E is
the set of edges in the graph.
x1 y1
u v
xk−1 yk−1
x2 y2
x1 y1
u v
xk−1 yk−1
x2 y2
p2
p1, . . . , pk
p1
pk
p3
k − 2
k − 2
Nash Equilibrium with social cost k
Routing with optimal social cost 1
Fig. 2. High price of anarchy with linear utility cost functions
Several questions remain to be investigated in the future. A
natural question that arises is what is the impact of polynomial
cost functions to the price of anarchy. Polynomial cost functions
with low degree give high price of anarchy. Consider the game
instance of Figure 2 where the player cost is pci =
∑
e∈pi
Ce
which is a linear function on the congestion of the edges on the
player’s path. In this game there k players pi1, . . . , pik where all
9the players have source u and destination v which are connected
by edge e. The graph consists of k−1 edge-disjoint paths from
u to v each of length k. There is a Nash equilibrium, depicted
in the top of Figure 2, where every player chooses to use a
path of length 1 on edge e. This is an equilibrium because the
cost of each player is k, while the cost of every alternative
path is also k. Since the congestion of edge e is k the social
cost is k. The optimal solution for the same routing problem
is depicted in the bottom of Figure 2, where every player uses
a edge-disjoint path and thus the maximum congestion on any
edge is 1. Therefore, the price of anarchy is at least k. Since
we can choose k = Θ(
√
n), where n is the number of nodes
in the graph, the price of anarchy is Ω(
√
n).
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